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AbstrAct
An ombudsman institution is one of the most rapidly developing institutions 
in modern democratic states. Ombudsmen can be characterised as individual 
and impartial investigators of administration and its conduct. They act 
as dispute resolution mechanisms between the state and individuals and 
sometimes also as solvers of problems of individuals. In order to assess 
the quality of administrative conduct they use normative standards against 
which they assess this conduct. However, all these matters are primarily in 
the hands of the judiciary. The judiciary, notably administrative courts are 
the most important dispute resolution mechanisms in modern states that 
assess the administrative conduct against certain normative standards. 
Thus ombudsmen and the judiciary can be often seen as institutions having 
relatively similar competences in a relatively similar area, despite retaining 
numerous differences. They both are approached by the individuals and they 
can express their opinions about administrative justice. This paper highlights 
the main findings and recommendations of a comparative legal research 
carried out in the area of mutual interrelations of ombudsmen and the 
judiciary. On the examples of three different legal systems (the Netherlands, 
England and the European Union) the research discusses the possibility of 
coordination of relations between the ombudsman and the judiciary in 
connection with the position of these institutions, with their jurisprudence 
and ombudsprudence and with normative standards they use in their work.
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1 Introduction
An ombudsman institution is one of the most rapidly developing institutions 
in modern democratic states.1 Nowadays, only a minor fraction of all states 
do not have this institution on a national or, at least, on a local level. Usually, 
they represent the ”prolonged hand of national parliaments” in the state 
administration. In this connection they individually and impartially investigate 
1 this paper, as well as the book, uses the term ombudsman also for women working at this 
post. they do not want to discriminate them but they do it for the sake of consistency of the 
text. For the same reason they do not use the terms as ”ombudswoman”, ”ombudsperson”, 
”ombudsbody” or ”ombuds”.
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the conduct of the administration. While investigating the conduct of the 
administration they apply normative standards against which they assess this 
conduct. Generally, they can assess the compliance of administrative conduct 
against various normative concepts including the law, general concepts such 
as good administration, proper administration or human rights (Remáč, 
2013). Ombudsmen also act as dispute resolution mechanisms between the 
state and individuals. However, they are not the only state institutions that 
resolve the disputes of discontented individuals. Most countries have other 
traditional mechanisms that primarily resolve these disputes. These traditional 
mechanisms are courts and tribunals or, in general, the judiciary. Compared 
to these traditional mechanisms, ombudsmen generally have several specific 
competences (”ombudsmen extras”) such as own initiative investigations, the 
ability to make legally non-binding recommendations or the ability to identify 
and address structural problems within the administration.
Relations between ombudsman and the judiciary are nowadays relatively 
under-researched. One can observe some attempts to investigate these 
relations in some individual countries (Dragoş, Neamtu, & Balica, 2010), but 
comparative research does not really exist.2 Until now, that is. This was one 
of the reasons for a PhD research that was carried out between October 
2009 and October 2013 at the Montaigne Centre of the Utrecht University. 
The research was carried out in three completely different legal systems. It 
includes the legal system of England (common law), the legal system of the 
Netherlands (continental law) and the legal system of the European Union 
and specifically the following ombudsman institutions:
• the Dutch National Ombudsman, 
• the UK Parliamentary Ombudsman, 
• English Local Government Ombudsmen and
• the European Ombudsman.
The research answered three research questions directly connected with the 
coordination between ombudsmen and the judiciary, namely: 
• how are the relations between ombudsmen and the judiciary as state 
institutions coordinated in the researched systems and what is the 
content of this coordination?
• what is the mutual significance of the reports and the judgments and 
their content for the other researched institution and what are their 
interrelations? and 
• what is the mutual significance of the normative standards of 
ombudsmen and the judiciary in the researched systems and what are 
the interrelations between these normative standards? 
2 There is comparative research on the ombudsmen included in Kucsko-Stadlmayer (2008) but 
this particular research compares the ombudsman institutions between themselves and not 
with the judiciary.
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In order to answer these research questions in a systematic manner, the 
research assessed several written sources:
•	 academic writings and articles written about ombudsmen and the 
judiciary in the researched systems;
•	 presentations and speeches of the researched ombudsmen;
•	 written law, including statutes establishing ombudsmen and their 
competences;3 statutes establishing the judiciary,4 and sub-statutory 
rules dealing with the powers of ombudsmen or the judiciary.5 In 
connection with the part of the research dealing with the European 
Union the major treaties were researched;
•	 jurisprudence of the courts and tribunals included into the research. In 
this connection a limitation was adopted as only court decisions from 
2005–2013 were closely researched;6 
•	 ombudsprudence of the researched ombudsmen. A time limitation 
was adopted also in connection with the ombudsprudence as only the 
”decisions” of ombudsmen from 2005–2013 were closely researched;7 
and
•	 other documents adopted and developed by the ombudsmen (annual 
reports and collections of their normative standards).
In order to provide also an empirical direction to the research, a number of 
interviews were carried out. The interviewed persons were all (at the time 
of the research) incumbent ombudsmen, various judges from national courts 
and tribunals and from the Court of Justice of the European Union and various 
professionals working directly with the researched institutions. 
From a methodological perspective the research was a combination of 
traditional legal (desk) research and empirical research, as part of the data was 
received through interviews or questionnaires. In general, the research used 
three	different	systems	of	ombudsmen-judiciary	relations	as	three	different	
case studies.8	 This	 paper	 points	 to	 the	 main	 findings	 and	 the	 conclusions	
of	 the	 research.	 The	 validity	 and	 accuracy	 of	 the	 individual	 findings	 were,	
among others, ensured by a substantive and comprehensive check of the 
parts	dealing	with	the	different	legal	systems	by	academics	with	an	in-depth	
knowledge	of	each	legal	system	included	in	the	research.	The	findings	were	
also presented before an international academic public on several occasions.
3 For example, Dutch 1982 Wet Nationale ombudsman or UK 1974 Local Government Act.
4 For example, Dutch 1975 Wet op de Raad van State or the UK 1981 Supreme Court Act.
5 For example, the UK Civil procedure rules or the UK Pre-Action protocol for judicial review.
6 In some cases, for example, when dealing with the normative coordination between 
ombudsmen and the judiciary, the research also takes into account older court decisions.
7 In some cases, for example, when dealing with the normative coordination between 
ombudsmen and the judiciary, the research also takes into account older court decisions.
8	 In	order	to	see	a	complete	methodology	of	the	research	see,	Remáč,	2014,	pp.	11−24.
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The findings included in this paper are based on a comparative research 
of the relations in three legal systems included in the research (England, 
the Netherlands and the European Union) and they represent a set of final 
findings of a PhD research published by the publishing house Intersentia in 
2014.
2 Coordination between ombudsmen and the judiciary?
Generally, ombudsmen and the judiciary exist alongside each other. First of 
all, the judiciary and ombudsmen are state institutions. They exercise state 
powers provided for them by the legislator through the law. They exercise 
these powers in a similar sphere - the sphere of administrative justice.9 If one 
perceives their roles in a broad fashion it is possible to see that the judiciary 
and ombudsman exercise their functions as dispute resolution mechanisms 
between individuals and the (state) administration. In connection with the 
original relation between individuals and the administration the ombudsmen 
and the judiciary are both in a secondary position. The judiciary here stands as 
a traditional dispute resolution mechanism while the ombudsmen are one of 
the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.10 Based on this presumption, 
the dispute resolution function of ombudsmen has an alternative and 
subsidiary character as regards the dispute resolution function of the judiciary. 
However, it is not just an alternative, as ombudsmen can approach a different 
aspect of the conduct of the administration or approach the same conduct by 
the administration while applying different methods and techniques to those 
of the judiciary, such as informally approaching the administration, trying to 
mediate the dispute or trying to reach a friendly settlement between the 
parties to the dispute. Despite the differences between these institutions one 
cannot overlook their potential similarities and overlaps. These matters then 
raise several questions relating to the desirability of coordination between 
these institutions.
When applying the basics of Minzberg’s organisational theory11 to the 
relations between ombudsmen and the judiciary one has to take into 
account two fundamental and opposing requirements of this theory: the 
division of labour into the various tasks and the coordination of these tasks 
accomplishing the goal.12 If we look at the state as a big ”organisation” these 
two requirements are also visible. Coordination, according to Mintzberg, is 
based on several mechanisms that should be considered as the most basic 
9 The comprehensive definition of ”administrative justice” was (until August 2013) applied by 
the Administrative Justice and Tribunal Council (England) according to which administrative 
justice includes the procedures for making administrative decisions, the law that regulates 
decision-making, and the systems (such as the various tribunals and ombudsmen) that enable 
people to challenge these decisions. See, Principles for Administrative Justice (2010).
10 See, for example, Reif (2004, p.16).
11 See Organisation theory is used to explain tendencies that drive effective organisations to 
structure themselves as they do. See, Mintzberg (1983, p. 3).
12 Ibid.
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elements of the structure, the glue that holds organisations together. These 
mechanisms include mutual adjustment, direct supervision, standardization 
of work processes, standardization of output, standardization of skills and 
standardization of norms (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 3). Thus, coordination within 
this meaning is not perceived as coordination which is only included in formal 
and legally binding norms. In line with this theory, in this book coordination 
between ombudsmen and the judiciary is perceived as the managing of 
cooperative or competitive dependencies between ombudsmen and the 
judiciary in order to reach common goals.
The research recognises three different levels of the coordination of 
ombudsmen-judiciary relations: the level of institutional coordination, the 
level of case coordination and the level of normative coordination. The first 
level (institutional coordination) is the broadest as it covers coordination 
between ombudsmen and the judiciary as state institutions. This level is 
connected with the doctrine of the division of powers and the doctrine of 
checks and balances between the ombudsmen and the judiciary. The second 
level (case coordination) covers coordination between ombudsmen and the 
judiciary as dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions that stand between 
individuals and the state. It is connected with the perception of ombudsmen 
and the judiciary as checks and balances against executive power. The third 
level (normative coordination) is the narrowest one. It is only connected with 
the normative standards applied and developed by these institutions both 
within and outside their proceedings. It can be perceived from the position of 
law and morality and law and good administration. 
The research of these three levels of coordination led in the thesis to several 
research-based findings and several analyse-based recommendations. 
2.1 Institutional coordination
On the level of institutional coordination the research led to the findings 
connected with the institutional organisation of ombudsmen and the judiciary. 
Similar to the other two levels of coordination these findings are based on an 
analysis of ombudsmen-judiciary relations in the Netherlands, England and the 
EU. The findings presented here are also explained. However, in comparison 
with the original text of the book the explanations of these findings are more 
general and do not refer back to the particular legal system or systems where 
they were found. For more precise and more comprehensive findings, see the 
findings included in the text of the thesis itself.
The first finding on this level is rather obvious. It states that despite their 
similarities, the ombudsmen and the judiciary are different bodies and that 
ombudsmen are not only dispute resolution mechanisms. The powers of the 
judiciary are in principle well known. The judiciary solves disputes between 
parties in formal procedures that lead to legally binding judgments. The 
judiciary assesses compliance with the law by using codified or uncodified 
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legal norms. General knowledge concerning ombudsmen is not that 
extensive. Although they have been around since at least the 1960s one can 
see that there is a tendency for ombudsmen to reiterate their powers and 
to underline their independence. Ombudsmen are traditionally perceived 
as alternative dispute mechanisms in addition to the courts. The research 
shows that the term ”alternative” does not only mean only that a dispute 
can be solved by ombudsmen or by the judiciary, but also that ombudsmen 
have some additional competences that distinguish them and their dispute 
resolution from that of the judiciary. These additional strengths include 
their own-initiative investigations; the possibility to make non-binding 
recommendations; the ability to address structural problems of the 
administration and to highlight them; the potential to develop norms of 
conduct and guidance for administrative conduct; and, last but not least the 
discretion of ombudsmen to approach the problem between the individual 
and the (state) administration in any way that can potentially lead to a 
solution of the core of this problem. The existence of these powers and their 
application by ombudsmen points to the fact that they are not identical to the 
judiciary. These powers are also a sign that an ombudsman institution is not a 
kind of inferior court. Of course, one should not see ombudsmen as a panacea 
for all administrative problems (Remáč, 2014, p. 331). 
The second finding is also rather obvious and shows that the legislator only 
formally establishes a general institutional framework with powers and 
competences for the ombudsmen and the judiciary. In the researched systems, 
ombudsmen were established within the system of a working judiciary. The 
judiciary as one of the traditional bearers of state powers was provided 
with the power to resolve disputes between individuals and the (state) 
administration. It resolves these disputes in connection with the normative 
concepts of lawfulness or legality.13 The researched ombudsmen, however, 
resolve these disputes in connection with the normative concepts of good 
(proper) administration. Different normative concepts of the ombudsmen 
and the judiciary are determined by the legislator as the general framework 
where these state institutions exercise their competences and powers. This 
finding shows that the legislator plays an important role in the existence of 
these institutions and the division of their powers as well as in setting their 
frameworks (Remáč, 2014, p. 332).  
The third finding on the level of institutional coordination reveals that the 
protection and dispute resolution of the judiciary often limit the protection 
and dispute resolution of the ombudsmen while the protection and dispute 
resolution of the ombudsmen do not, in principle, limit the protection and 
dispute resolution of the judiciary. The three researched systems show that 
13 The ombudsmen included in the research belong into what can be traditionally described as 
the ”second generation of the ombudsmen”. They assess the compliance of the administration 
against the general concept of good administration, proper administration or they discover 
maladministration or malpractice in the work of administration. See, Remáč (2013).
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formally the protection offered by ombudsmen is somewhat limited if the 
judiciary exercises or has already exercised its protection functions. The 
ombudsmen are often required to halt their investigations (or not to start 
them at all) if the substance of the complaint has previously been dealt with 
by the judiciary or is at the time of the investigation currently being resolved 
by judiciary. Thus despite the different normative frameworks of ombudsmen 
and the judiciary, they cannot deal with the same substance of the cases 
simultaneously. Conversely, if the ombudsmen have assessed the substance 
of the case, the judiciary can generally deal with the case from the position of 
lawfulness. The research shows that ombudsmen occasionally have discretion 
to investigate complaints even if their substance has already been assessed 
by the judiciary, although these situations are not very common.14  
A further finding shows that the interaction between ombudsmen and the 
judiciary follows, almost identically, the framework designed by the legislator 
and the interpretation of the courts. Beyond this framework, any (formal 
or informal) interaction between these institutions is only marginal and 
occurs on an ad hoc basis. Although ombudsmen and the judiciary provide an 
independent and impartial dispute resolution and for that reason they stand 
between individuals and the administration, their interaction is very limited, 
indeed it is almost non-existent. Formally, these institutions stick closely 
to their spheres of interest and general frameworks. Only rarely do legal 
provisions expressly enable some form of cooperation between ombudsmen 
and the judiciary. Because of this, formal interplay and cooperation between 
them are rather uncommon. So is their informal interplay. The existing 
communication or cooperation only takes place on an ad hoc basis. It is by 
no means premeditated. The practice of informal interaction can range from 
unofficial meetings between judges and ombudsmen at conferences to the 
official meetings between the presidents of the courts and ombudsmen. This 
limited interaction is usually explained by different competences, different 
normative concepts and different working methods. One can also discover a 
tendency to underline the necessity of complete institutional independence.15 
The last finding on the level of institutional coordination shows that the 
courts sometimes explain their ability to review the legality of the reports 
or actions of ombudsmen and that even if they deduce that they have these 
powers, they generally respect the competences of the ombudsmen. In some 
systems the courts review the legality of ombudsmen’s actions and decisions. 
This power is usually not provided on the basis of statutory law but the courts 
derive it from the character of such a legality review. The research shows that 
the courts are careful when making use of this competence. Nonetheless, if a 
court can judicially review the actions of an ombudsman the character of their 
relationship thereby changes. While exercising their functions ombudsmen 
must then take into account ”the court behind their shoulder”. Interestingly 
14 Ibid., p. 333.
15 Ibid., p. 334.
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enough, this power of the courts cannot be understood as an appeal against 
the reports or any other decisions of the ombudsmen. A judicial review 
is usually only connected with assessing whether an ombudsman, while 
reaching his decisions, has acted in a lawful manner. Sometimes the possibility 
to assess the legality of an ombudsman’s actions is connected with cases of 
the ombudsman’s responsibility for non-contractual damage.16
2.2 Case coordination
The level of case coordination is directly connected with institutional 
coordination and with the fact that both institutions act as dispute resolution 
mechanisms. It covers the possible coordination between the formal results 
of the deliberating and decision-making processes of ombudsmen and the 
courts, i.e., the reports and judgments.17 Here the research demonstrates the 
following findings.
The first finding on this level is that relations between ombudsmen and the 
judgments of the judiciary as well as the judiciary and the ombudsmen’s 
decisions are regulated only marginally. The legislator only determines the 
”field of play” for ombudsmen and the judiciary as well as the general rules. 
Any interconnection between reports and judgments is overlooked although 
the legislator often limits an ombudsman’s ability to control court judgments. 
The legislator often lays down rules on what type of evidence can be taken into 
account by the courts while deciding a case. The reports of the ombudsmen 
are not excluded. Conversely, in the case of ombudsmen this is usually left to 
the ombudsmen’s discretion (Remáč, 2014, p. 339.). 
The second finding argues that when necessary, ombudsmen, while drafting 
their reports, make cross-references to the case law of the courts (and the law 
in general). Conversely, however, while drafting their judgments, the judiciary 
only rarely makes cross-references to the reports of ombudsmen. Neither the 
ombudsmen nor the judiciary exist in a normative or societal vacuum. In all 
three researched systems it was possible to discover cases where ombudsmen 
make cross-references to judgments or to the judiciary. The reasons for such 
practice can be connected with a need to inform the readers of the reports 
about the facts of the case; to explain the applicability of the judgment in the 
ombudsman’s investigation or to use the rule previously adopted by the court 
and by that to support his own findings. Ombudsmen do not assess the quality 
of the judgments or the findings of the courts. Also the judiciary sometimes 
makes cross-references to ombudsmen or their reports. The reasons for this 
are very similar. They either try to inform the readers of the judgments about 
the facts of the case; to explain the applicability of the report or the powers 
of the ombudsman in general. Exceptionally, they use the rule previously 
16 Ibid., p. 335.
17 Although the report is not the only possible result of the ombudsman investigations, it can 
be perceived as a general term for the results of these investigations whether they are called 
investigation reports, draft recommendations or decisions etc.
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applied by an ombudsman or use his report to support their own findings. In 
cases where the courts can assess the legality of ombudsmen’s actions they 
make assessment statements about these actions. In general, this practice is 
ad hoc and it is not premeditated. In this case one can observe a difference in 
the inquisitorial approach of ombudsmen and the mainly adversarial approach 
of the judiciary.18
The next finding explains that ombudsmen acknowledge the applicability of 
judgments for their investigations/inquiries. Sometimes they consider them to 
be decisive in an investigated case. The judiciary does not ignore the existence 
of ombudsmen’s reports in its proceedings. However, it does not consider 
them to be decisive for its judgments. This shows that ombudsmen are aware 
of the judgments of the judiciary. They are aware of them in the same way 
as they are aware of the statutory law. If necessary, the jurisprudence of the 
courts (and statutory law) is taken into account. If the court, while assessing 
the lawfulness of an administrative action finds unlawfulness of this action, 
it is possible that ombudsmen will find a breach of good administration 
standards in a substantively similar case. This depends, however, on the 
connection between lawfulness and good or proper administration. On the 
other hand, one cannot say that the judiciary is ignorant of the reports of 
ombudsmen, although it uses them only rarely. The reports of ombudsmen 
do not have any special status among the evidence submitted to the courts. 
A report by an ombudsman is in principle not enough for the court to find a 
breach of law or to award damages.19 
The last finding on the level of case coordination reveals that an individual can 
rely on ombudsmen’s reports in court proceedings and on judgments during 
an ombudsman’s investigation/inquiry. Nonetheless, it is the ombudsmen 
and the judiciary themselves who decide what authority judgments or 
reports have in connection with a particular case. The research showed that 
individuals often rely on ombudsmen’s reports in court proceedings and on 
judgments during investigations by ombudsmen. A priori neither statutory 
law, nor secondary legislation or the practice of these institutions reject the 
possibility for individuals to rely on these documents. If such documents are 
submitted to them, they take them into account. If they are important for the 
investigation of an ombudsman or the court proceedings these institutions 
will refer to them. If a report or a judgment is not applicable, the courts or 
the ombudsmen will explain this. There is a general rule that a judgment 
which finds that there has been a breach of the law does not directly lead to 
a report which finds maladministration or improper administration and, vice 
versa, a report finding maladministration or improper administration does 
not directly lead to a judgment which finds that there has been a breach of 
18 Ibid., p. 340.
19 Ibid., p. 341.
20 International Public Administration Review, Vol. XII, No. 2−3, 2014 
Milan Remáč
the law. A judgement or a report is but one piece of evidence that should be 
weighed by the ombudsmen and the judiciary.20 
2.3 Normative coordination
The third level of coordination, normative coordination between ombudsmen 
and the judiciary, is connected with the normative standards that they use when 
assessing the administrative action in question. The basis for the normative 
coordination is the institutional coordination between ombudsmen and the 
judiciary and the overlapping character of the normative concepts used by 
ombudsmen and the judiciary – lawfulness and good (proper) administration.
Firstly, the legislator acknowledges the existence of different normative 
concepts of ombudsmen and the judiciary. The coordination of this matter is 
left to their practice. In connection with normative coordination the legislator 
is rather passive. Still, here it does play a certain role as it is the legislator that 
divides competences between ombudsmen and the judiciary and expressly 
decides that the judiciary assesses compliance with the law and ombudsmen 
assess compliance with a general normative concept such as good or proper 
administration. Although the legislator decides what is law (in a legislative 
process) it only rarely explains what is good (proper) administration or 
maladministration. The contents of these terms are left to the practice of 
the ombudsmen. Only rarely does the legislator or the jurisprudence ”help” 
ombudsmen with the meaning of these terms. Similarly, the legislator is 
silent on the relationship between normative concepts such as good (proper) 
administration and lawfulness. It leaves this issue to the mutual practice of 
ombudsmen and the judiciary and, naturally, to academic interest.21 
The second finding on this level reveals that ombudsmen and the judiciary 
develop their normative standards separately. Nonetheless, during the 
development of these standards inspiration can be drawn from other, already 
existing standards. Ombudsmen, as well as the judiciary, have normative 
functions. Generally, the judiciary can discover new legal principles. These 
new legal principles can remain as unwritten law or they can be codified 
in statutory or even constitutional law. The general principles of law are 
then used as normative standards of the judiciary. The normative function 
of ombudsmen is connected with the necessity to explain the content of 
general normative concepts as good/proper administration. This explanation 
is connected either with the development of the requirements of good/
proper administration, i.e. individual principles of this concept, or with the 
development of general guidance and recommendations on good/proper 
administrative conduct. It is evident that ombudsmen actively approach 
their normative functions through the development of lists of requirements 
20 Ibid., p. 342.
21 Ibid., p. 346.
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for good (proper) administration and the publishing of general guidance 
documents on good (proper) administrative conduct.22
The third finding has found that one can distinguish a formal and substantive 
overlap between some normative standards of the ombudsmen and the 
judiciary. Some of the normative standards of these institutions, however, 
do not overlap at all. Although the normative standards of ombudsmen and 
the judiciary have developed independently, one can discover some similarity 
between these normative standards. This similarity has two different layers. 
There is formal similarity that is connected with the wording and denomination 
of the individual standards. And there is substantive similarity that is connected 
with the content of individual standards. It seems that the majority of these 
normative standards developed and discovered by the judiciary are in one way 
or another reflected in the normative standards of ombudsmen. One cannot 
say that the normative standards of ombudsmen are merely reproductions of 
judicial or legal principles. The overlap does not stem from the binding power 
of the standards but from the value that is protected by them. The research 
proves that these substantively overlapping normative standards protect 
the same (or at least very similar) general values. The value is included in the 
general societal ethos. Depending on the importance of certain values, some 
of them are protected in a ”hard way” by the judiciary as well as in a ”soft way” 
by ombudsmen. Still, some of the normative standards do not overlap at all, 
i.e. the value is protected only by ombudsmen or by the judiciary. This shows 
that the normative standards of ombudsmen are not entirely identical to the 
normative standards of the judiciary. They can protect values that remain 
unprotected by the courts.23  
Another finding shows that a breach of the normative standards of the court 
can be evaluated by ombudsmen as a breach of their normative standards. 
Despite a substantive overlap between these normative standards, a breach 
of the ombudsmen’s normative standards is only rarely identified by the 
courts as a breach of their normative standards. The normative standards 
of ombudsmen and the judiciary differ. Despite their substantive similarity, 
breaches of these standards do not have the same consequences. A breach 
of the normative standards of the courts is necessarily a breach of the law 
and can be enforced. A breach of the normative standards of ombudsmen 
does not include any such penalty. The difference between these standards 
is underlined by the fact that a breach of the normative standards of one 
institution does not always lead to a breach of the normative standards of 
the other institution. This possibility is however not entirely excluded. In the 
ombudsprudence one can discover cases where a breach of a legal norm also 
leads to a breach of an ombudsnorm. However, a breach of an ombudsnorm 
only rarely directly leads to a breach of a legal norm. This is connected with 
the character of the normative concept that is protected by ombudsmen. 
22 Ibid., p. 347.
23 Ibid., p. 348.
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Concepts such as good (proper) administration are more flexible and more 
comprehensive than lawfulness. These concepts usually cover compliance 
with the law (including human rights) and compliance with good (proper) 
administration requirements in a strict sense. In all the legal systems studied it 
is possible to distinguish between the concept of good/proper administration 
and the concept of lawfulness. This leads to four different situations in which 
the administrative conduct in question can be either: 
Administrative conduct Good or proper Maladministrative or improper
Lawful Lawful and proper (good)
Lawful but improper 
(maladministrative)
Unlawful Unlawful but proper (good)
Unlawful and improper 
(maladministrative)
This scheme 24 shows that there can be a difference between compliance with 
the law and compliance with ombudsnorms. They are parallel concepts. The 
conduct of the administration should comply with legal principles as well as 
with ombudsnorms (Remáč, 2014, p. 349.). 
The last finding reveals that in the case of a substantive overlap, the normative 
standards of ombudsmen can potentially have a different application than 
the normative standards of the judiciary. A substantive overlap between the 
normative standards of the ombudsmen and the judiciary does not mean that 
the application of these normative standards is the same. In the practice of 
these institutions one can see that the normative standards of ombudsmen 
can be applied in a similar fashion as the standards of the courts. In this case 
the normative standards of the judiciary (legal norms) generally determine a 
minimum standard of administrative conduct. Theoretically, if an institution 
is going to act in accordance with this minimum standard, its conduct will be 
(in this connection) lawful and proper (good). However, one can also discover 
that the substantively overlapping normative standards can be applied by 
ombudsmen in a different, more lenient fashion that those of the judiciary. 
Then the ombudsnorms determine a minimum standard for conduct, at least 
for the ombudsmen. Then, theoretically, if an institution acts in accordance 
with the legal standard its actions may not satisfy the requirements of the 
ombudsman.25 
3 Recommended Changes of Existing Designs
The research shows that the systems of the ombudsmen and the judiciary 
as it is designed nowadays work. This however does not mean that these 
systems cannot work better. An analysis of the findings has led to several 
general recommendations that can potentially improve the mutual work 
24 The scheme used in this research has its basis in so called ”Ombudskwadrant” developed by the 
Dutch National Ombudsman. See, Nationale ombudsman (2006, p. 16).
25 Ibid., p. 351.
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of these institutions but also the chances of individuals in disputes with the 
administration. In connection with institutional coordination the analysis has 
led to the following recommendations:
1. The statutory bars barring ombudsmen from investigating complaints 
if they cover the same facts as applications to the judiciary should be 
removed.
2. The judiciary should have the competence to refer a case to the 
ombudsman if it clearly involves maladministration (improper 
administration) falling short of unlawfulness. At the same time the 
judiciary should have the competence to inform the ombudsman 
about possible structural administrative problems. In both cases the 
ombudsman should have the discretion to investigate these cases.    
3. There should be a communication forum where ombudsmen and 
the judiciary can discuss certain issues connected with improving the 
protection offered to individuals, their own roles, their different points 
of view or other matters connected with their functions.
These recommendations can lead to a possible improvement in the protection 
offered to individuals and to the full use of the potential of the judiciary and 
ombudsmen. First of all, ombudsmen offer additional protection compared to 
the courts. They assess compliance with a different normative concept than 
the courts. Because of this they should have the possibility to deal with the 
substance of the problem from the position of good (proper) administration 
if the court is already dealing with the substance of the problem from the 
position of lawfulness. Furthermore, if the judiciary and the ombudsmen 
were able to refer a part of the problem that is directly connected with a 
different normative concept to the other body, the problem could be solved 
from both perspectives (lawfulness and good administration). Clarification 
concerning the positions of these institutions (especially the powers of the 
ombudsmen) can lead to a better understanding but also to a better exercise 
of their powers as well as offering complete protection for individuals.
In connection with case coordination the analysis has led to the following 
recommendations:
1. The judiciary should not a priori reject the facts found by ombudsmen 
during their investigations. If they are relevant for the pertinent 
legal question, the judiciary could take them as a starting point in its 
assessment unless proved otherwise during the proceedings.
2. The judiciary and the ombudsmen should pay more attention to the 
explanation concerning the importance of the findings of the other 
institutions for their own proceedings or investigations, if these 
findings have been raised by one of the parties to their procedures.
The results of ombudsmen’s investigations and the proceedings of the 
judiciary, i.e., the reports and judgments, are a formal expression of their 
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work. The reports and their findings are based on the facts that are assessed 
by meticulous investigations by the ombudsmen. The findings of the 
ombudsmen are not a priori positive for individuals as ombudsmen try to be 
impartial and independent. Because of that the facts proven by ombudsmen, 
if they are referred to during court proceedings, should not be immediately 
rejected by the judiciary merely because it was only an ombudsman who found 
them. Individuals often rely on the reports of ombudsmen in proceedings 
before the court and on judgments during an ombudsman’s investigation. For 
an individual it is often difficult to see (without an explanation) the difference 
between a report and a judgment. Because of the fact that individuals 
support their contentions with reports or judgments, the ombudsmen and 
the judiciary should explain the reasons for their application or conversely 
their rejection. 
In connection with normative coordination the analysis has led to the following 
recommendations:
1. Ombudsmen should constantly (re)develop and apply their normative 
standards in practice. They should do this for the benefit of the 
administration, for the sake of clarity and to uphold their standards and 
for the sake of protecting individuals and society as a whole.
2. Ombudsmen should always refer to and explain the applied and 
breached normative standards in the findings and/or conclusions of 
their reports.
3. When developing normative standards which overlap with written law, 
ombudsmen should follow the meaning of written law. 
4. When developing normative standards which overlap with unwritten 
legal principles, ombudsmen should do this freely; however, their 
development should take into account the general value that is 
protected by unwritten legal principles.
5. The judiciary should not overlook the normative standards of 
ombudsmen, as they may potentially have a positive impact on the 
development of the law. It is thus necessary for the judiciary to be 
aware of the normative standards of ombudsmen.
The normative standards of ombudsmen and of the judiciary are a 
manifestation of their normative function. In this area, ombudsmen are more 
active than the judiciary. This is connected with the flexibility or rather the 
vagueness of their normative concepts. Because of that they should clearly 
explain what the content of such a normative concept is. As shown by all three 
case studies, the development and application of normative standards by 
ombudsmen and the judiciary is relatively independent. One can imagine that 
ombudsmen develop and apply their normative standards in a more lenient 
fashion than the judiciary, i.e. differently. On the one hand, it is necessary 
for ombudsmen to apply and develop their principles in a more lenient 
and more flexible way because they evaluate compliance with a general 
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normative concept that is not identical to lawfulness. On the other hand, this 
normative concept often requires the administration to act in compliance 
with the law and legal principles. Especially this second point can be used 
in order to question an ombudsman’s leniency. An over-lenient approach by 
the ombudsman to a normative standard overlapping with written law can 
lead to uncertainty about the contents of this standard. Ombudsmen as 
state institutions are naturally bound by the law. Ombudsmen have greater 
flexibility when developing standards which overlap with unwritten principles 
of the law. For the sake of clarity concerning their normative concepts, they 
should refer in their findings to the normative standards used and breached. 
As the development of the law or of good (proper) administration is far from 
complete ombudsmen and the judiciary should also pay attention to the 
normative standards of the other institution as they can be an inspiration for 
the further development of these normative concepts.
4 Conclusions
This article does not give as much information as the book can give, but 
it provides with findings and recommendations included in the thesis 
that was published at the beginning of 2014. Nonetheless, it shows that 
ombudsmen and the judiciary are two different state institutions with their 
own competences, their own work, their own working methods and their 
own normative concepts and standards. Despite these differences, they have 
in common the fact that they resolve disputes between individuals and the 
administration. They both add to the protection of individuals. They try to 
solve the problems of the administration (legal or otherwise) and inevitably 
they add to the trust of individuals in the state.
While they exercise their functions one can discover a place for their potential 
coordination. One can see that there is institutional coordination that rules 
the competences and roles between these institutions. Here it is not possible 
to overlook the role of the legislator that actively sets the framework for 
the work of ombudsmen and the judiciary. The design of the institutional 
coordination predestines any other type of coordination between these 
institutions. Because of that, case coordination, coordination linked with the 
findings of the ombudsmen and the judiciary and normative coordination, 
coordination of their normative standards are directly connected with their 
competences. 
One can imagine a further coordination of the actions of ombudsmen and the 
judiciary in the sense of mutual cooperation. Such coordination may allow the 
judiciary and the ombudsmen to use their powers more comprehensively. It 
can also bring more clarity to their normative standards and enable mutual 
coordination during their development. Last but not least, it can lead to a 
better understanding of the different types of protection afforded to 
individuals and can provide them with a complete assessment of their 
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disputes with the administration. Thus, cooperation between ombudsmen 
and the judiciary can influence the fulfilment of their roles, the protection 
of individuals, the development of normative concepts and standards and 
dispute resolution as such. Ombudsmen and the judiciary as state institutions 
have their strengths and weaknesses. First of all, the protection of individuals 
and the dispute resolution provided by the judiciary are often not enough. 
If this were so, there would not be any need for an ombudsman in the first 
place. However, individuals often need more than just formal confirmation 
that they were right and that the administration was wrong. They need their 
problem to be solved. Ombudsmen can provide additional dispute resolution. 
They can react to the particular problem and if the administration is willing 
to cooperate, they can work on its swift and informal removal. Their informal 
methods of dispute resolution and their non-legally binding problem-
prevention recommendations can add to the legally binding assessments 
of the judiciary. Ombudsmen also have specific powers that can push them 
beyond the mechanism for solving disputes. For instance, their own-interest 
investigations and their non-binding recommendations provide a considerable 
addition to the protection of individuals. They are not only dispute resolution 
mechanisms. At the same time, one must understand that ombudsmen are not 
a panacea for the administration. They cannot heal or prevent all its problems. 
Undoubtedly, they can bring a more ”moral” sense to the administration but 
they can only do this within the limits and competences given to them.
Generally, ombudsmen and the judiciary understand that their different 
roles and different powers allow them to approach disputes from different 
perspectives. They should however try to understand that only one way 
of solving disputes is often not enough to solve the problem between an 
individual and the administration in a comprehensive manner. The first step 
in this understanding can be reached through broader communication. Such 
communication can perhaps show that they are not mutual competitors but 
that they can work together towards general goals within the competences 
that are given to them. It is not enough to say we do something else and 
that is why we do not need to cooperate. It is more challenging to say we do 
something else, but we also keep in mind that our general goals can bring 
us closer and help us to work better and in the interest of individuals, the 
administration and society as a whole.  
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POvzETEk
1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek
Usklajevanje varuhov človekovih pravic in sodstva: 
boljše možnosti za posameznike? 
Ključne besede: ombudsman - varuh človekovih pravic, sodstvo, upravni postopki, 
usklajevanje
Institucija varuha človekovih pravic je ena od najhitreje razvijajočih se institucij 
v sodobnih demokratičnih državah. varuhe človekovih pravic lahko označimo 
za posamične in neodvisne preiskovalce uprave in njenega ravnanja. Delujejo 
kot mehanizmi za reševanje sporov med državo in posamezniki, včasih pa 
tudi kot reševalci težav posameznikov. za oceno kakovosti ravnanja uprave 
uporabljajo normativne standarde,  katerih izpolnjevanje preverjajo. vendar 
pa so vse te zadeve primarno v pristojnosti sodstva. Sodstvo in predvsem 
upravna sodišča so najpomembnejši mehanizem za reševanje sporov, ki 
ocenjuje upravno ravnanje v primerjavi z določenimi normativnimi standardi. 
Tako lahko varuha človekovih pravic in sodstvo pogosto označimo za instituciji 
z relativno podobnimi pristojnostmi na razmeroma podobnem področju, 
čeprav med njima obstajajo številne razlike. Na oba se obračajo posamezniki in 
oba lahko izražata svoje mnenje o upravni pravičnosti. v članku so poudarjene 
glavne ugotovitve in priporočila primerjalno-pravne raziskave, ki je bila 
izvedena na področju medsebojnih odnosov varuhov človekovih pravic in 
sodstva. Raziskava na primerih treh različnih pravnih sistemov (Nizozemska, 
Anglija in Evropska unija) obravnava možnosti usklajevanja odnosov med 
varuhom človekovih pravic in sodstvom v povezavi s položajem obeh institucij, 
z njuno prakso in normativnimi standardi, ki jih uporabljata pri svojem delu.
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